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ARTICLE CASE
Grassroots vs. Big Oil
Measure P and the fight to ban fracking in Santa Barbara County, California
CORRIE GROSSE
Department of Sociology, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States
Email: corriegrosse@gmail.com
ABSTRACT In 2014, volunteers in Santa Barbara County, California, collected over 20,000 signatures in three weeks
to qualify an anti-fracking initiative for the November election. The initiative, Measure P, met over six million dollars in
opposition from oil corporations. Despite mobilizing 1,000 volunteers, the proponents of the measure failed to garner
enough votes for success. Drawing on 43 in-depth interviews and participant observation with environmental groups
before, during, and after the campaign, this article examines the strengths and weaknesses of grassroots organizing
behind Measure P. Organizers, especially during the signature drive, successfully garnered broad-based support in
the southern part of the county, an affluent and tourist-dependent area with no onshore oil drilling. Messages based
on water, made more salient by California’s historic drought, resonated with many residents. Yet, after qualifying for
the ballot, proponents of the campaign allied with the local Democratic Party, changing their organizing practices and
forestalling bipartisan support. Outreach to Latinos in all areas of the county, and particularly in the northern part,
where onshore drilling takes place, was limited. Finally, the overwhelming inequality between the financial power of pro-
ponents and the oil industry influenced the outcome. Based on this case, I argue that coalition building and groundwork
to develop support within all sectors of communities, especially those most dependent on fossil fuel extraction, is critical
to strengthening grassroots efforts that challenge the energy status quo.
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Readers of this case will examine () grassroots organizing as
a social response to unconventional energy extraction in the
context of climate change, () ballot measures as a strategy
for changing energy infrastructures in the United States,
() tactics by grassroots mobilizations and fossil fuel corpo-
rations to secure their respective interests, and () how




Hydraulic fracturing, “fracking”, and other intensive tech-
niques for extracting natural gas and oil are expanding
across the United States and globe. In , two thirds of
natural gas [] and half of oil production [] in the United
States, the global leader in oil and gas production, came
from hydraulically fractured wells. Fracking is associated
with negative health effects [], water contamination [],
and greenhouse gas emissions []. For these reasons, people
have mobilized to oppose it. Four European countries have
banned fracking. In Romania, protestors occupied a pro-
posed fracking site until Chevron announced it would
abandon operations there in . In the United States,
communities from Texas to Pennsylvania to Colorado
(and many other places) have worked to ban or restrict
the technique. They have fought for fracking moratoriums
pending further study of risks, disclosure of the chemicals
used in fracking, increased distance between fracking wells
and homes or schools, and local, rather than state control,
over fracking regulations.
This case examines resistance to fracking in Santa
Barbara County, where Big Oil has had a foothold since
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the late s, when offshore oil drilling was pioneered in
the Santa Barbara Channel. In , the county was the
site of the first major oil spill, a disaster that catalyzed the
modern environmental movement. Since then, oil produc-
tion has continued offshore, alongside predominantly
affluent white beach communities in southern Santa
Barbara County, and onshore, near predominantly Latino
communities in northern Santa Barbara County. In ,
Santa Barbara was the sixth-largest county oil producer in
California, the nation’s third-largest state oil producer [].
In , a small group of Santa Barbara residents came
together to invigorate grassroots power to confront the
oil industry. Meeting in late February  as  Santa
Barbara, a one-year old chapter of the international climate
movement organization .org, members listened as
Katie Davis and Becca Claassen, the women would come
to lead the Yes on Measure P campaign, proposed the
ballot measure idea. The other six activists in the room
agreed to support the effort and on April , volunteers
around the county began collecting signatures to support
an initiative that would ban the use of intensive extr-
action techniques—fracking, acidization, and cyclic steam
injection—in new onshore wells.1 I was part of the cam-
paign from the beginning and, in the next two years,
conducted  in-depth interviews with local activists.
In the next seven months, people who had never been
active before mobilized around the issue; longtime political
strategists and heads of Santa Barbara’s many environmen-
tal non-profit organizations weighed in; and Big Oil,
perhaps surprised by the signature gathering success, poured
money into an opposition campaign. The confluence of
these factors, combined with the demographic and political
context of the county, informed the strengths and weak-




One word—people power. Activists behind the effort to
qualify Measure P for the ballot successfully mobilized a
broad base of not only supporters, but people who would
take time out of their day to stand on the corner, in front
of the grocery store, and on campus to ask people to sign
petitions. Throughout the campaign, over , volunteers
mobilized—more than any other anti-fracking effort in
California to date. More than this quantity, however, was
the quality of volunteers’ engagement. Accustomed to orga-
nizing through consensus-based decisions and without for-
mal leadership, the originators of the measure were
committed to horizontal leadership. They formed seven
teams throughout the county. Each had one or two “team
captains” who were responsible for training signature gath-
erers, collecting signature packets, and tallying signatures
totals. In North County, residents alarmed by the oil pro-
duction around them collected thousands of signatures.
An undergraduate student and I were co-captains for the
area around the University of California, Santa Barbara.
Each signature gatherer set personal goals and timelines.
With this model, over , handwritten signatures in
support of placing the initiative on the ballot were collected
in three weeks. ,—, more than needed—were
deemed valid because they were from registered voters.
Meeting this threshold prompted the County Board of
Supervisors to place the initiative, which became Measure
P, before voters in November .
A sense of urgency contributed to the energy behind this
early phase of the campaign. All core members had come
together around the issue of climate change, many inspired
by Bill McKibben’s  article “Global Warming’s Terri-
fying New Math,” which argued that fossil fuels must be
kept in the ground to avoid warming the planet past two
degrees Celsius []. Abysmal report-backs from members
of the group who attended the th Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change in November  contributed to the
sense that local climate action was critical. Becca Claassen
and Katie Davis felt so committed to securing a livable
future that they put their careers on hold to be full-time
volunteer organizers.
Another dimension of the urgency—why proponents
pushed the initiative forward despite some more seasoned
electoral campaigners’ cautionary tales about low voter
turnout in mid-term elections—was looming oil develop-
ment.  Santa Barbara’s first victory occurred in 
when the County Board of Supervisors required the local
oil company Santa Maria Energy to purchase offsets for
emissions above a , ton per year threshold on its
-well expansion.  Santa Barbara felt that their push
to reject the project completely, when other environmental
groups were pushing for regulation, contributed to stricter
emissions policies. On the heels of this victory, activists. Offshore oil production is not within the county’s jurisdiction.
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learned of an impending boom in unconventional oil
production in the county, which sits atop the Monterey
Shale formation. In the short term, according to the
county, applications for  wells were permitted, pro-
posed, or anticipated, % using high-intensity techniques.
In the longer term, Santa Maria Energy disclosed plans for
, new wells []. The emissions from these projects
would eliminate progress the group had made so far
through activism and lifestyle changes.
Alongside their passion and sense of urgency, the core
group of activists behind the measure had the time—what
scholars refer to as “biographical availability” []. They
were retired, students, full-time activists, and people with
flexible work schedules. These factors combined to nourish
a grassroots campaign that became a formidable force.
Threats and weaknesses
Ultimately, activists’ passion and energy and even high voter
approval ratings in summer of  (%) proved insuffi-
cient to pass Measure P. Entrenched oil industry power,
insufficient groundwork before the campaign, and, in organ-
izers’ views, the change in tactics brought on by collabora-
tion with the Democratic Party shaped the outcome.
During Measure P, the oil industry continued its tradi-
tion of using money to shape politics (see []). A group
called Californians for Energy Independence, whose donors
included California-based Chevron (the state’s largest oil
and gas producer), regional, and local oil companies,
surprised proponents by funneling over six million dollars
to opposition efforts. Measure P proponents raised over
$,—outspent more than  to one. This, combined
with the fact that many contributions to proponents
arrived late in the campaign, inhibited outreach efforts.
One effect of low funding for outreach was that some vot-
ers assumed that the opponents represented their interests.
As Hazel Davalos, Organizing Director for Central Coast
Alliance United for a Sustainable Economy (CAUSE),
which supported the measure, explained, Latino voters in
North County frequently heard—on local and large-scale
media platforms, including Univision and Telemundo—
No on P messaging in Spanish from North County Latino
spokespeople. Latinos comprised % of the county popu-
lation of , in , and % of the ,-person
city of Santa Maria, North County’s largest city. People
were like, “oh they are actually advertising to us. They must
be the campaign that has our interests at heart” (inter-
view, Hazel Davalos). Some of these ads focused on how
loss of tax revenues from oil would hurt local schools
that predominantly working-class Latino communities—
composed largely of agricultural workers—depend on.2
Yes on P not only had fewer resources for media outreach,
but also made a costly mistake when non-resident cam-
paign staff bought ads on Spanish-speaking radio in South,
but not North, County. Not having as large of a base in
North County, Yes on P spokespeople were typically from
South County and therefore, where not people that most
North County residents recognized.
The sheer quantity of No on Pmessages, which centered
on loss of jobs and tax revenues, was also insurmountable.
Proponents spent their energy countering industry lies,
rather than educating the community about the water
and health risks of fracking—a message that is as relevant
to Latino agricultural workers as it is to white tourist sector
employees, who both depend on the environment for their
livelihoods. Creating doubt is a powerful tactic in and of
itself, as evidenced by the fossil fuels industry’s efforts to
manufacture doubt about climate change []. Central
points around which doubt emerged were whether the
initiative applied to existing oil wells (it did not), and,
related to this, if the county would be at risk of lawsuits.
A county staff report [] with incorrect information exac-
erbated this situation and was cited by opponents through-
out the campaign despite the report’s rejection by the
County Supervisors. In Becca Claassen’s view, the county
suffers from regulatory capture by the oil industry—staff
in Santa Barbara County’s Energy Division depend on
the oil status quo for their jobs. Finally, industry arguments
overstated the jobs and taxes supplied by the industry. Oil
and gas production accounted for only .% of county
jobs and .% of county property taxes [] and directly
threatens the county’s largest economic sectors—agriculture
and tourism. The measure exempted existing production,
and therefore, would have had little effect on existing jobs
and tax revenues.
Insufficient groundwork leading up to the campaign was
a primary weakness of its proponents’ efforts. They were a
small grassroots group, that, on hearing that their efforts
would be negated by oil expansion, decided to take electoral
action in a much shorter period than is customary.
More established members of Santa Barbara County’s
environmental community cautioned the proponents
. For an example, see No on P ad: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=DTdAkJnc.
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about the difficulty of passing a fracking ban in a mid-
term election, which are known to have low voter
turnout, especially among progressives. In interviews
following the election, these established environmental
and party figures also explained that the rapidity of the
campaign inhibited relationship-building with local
leaders, labor unions, key spokespeople, and potential
donors. This likely contributed to surprising endorsements
of No on P by the generally progressive Santa Barbara
Independent—though a coalition of editors wrote against
this endorsement—and by public safety groups such as
the Santa Barbara Fire Fighters Local and Police Officers
Association. As described above, it made it difficult to
build relationships and cultivate support in the Latino com-
munity. More preparation time, explained Linda Krop,
Chief Counsel of the Environmental Defense Center in
Santa Barbara, might also have prevented the dissemina-
tion of false information by county staff.
It goes back to the starting early. When I’ve written
initiatives before, I will often run them by county
staff and counsel, and say here’s what we’re trying to
do . . . [agency staff can’t take a formal position, but]
they can look at it and say, “What do you mean by
this?” or “We are concerned about how this might
affect well maintenance,” and then we can have that
conversation and resolve it before it hits the streets
and then we don’t have the county’s opposition. So
all of those kind of preliminary things didn’t happen
(interview).
Many of these established groups, though skeptical and
cautionary about the proponents’ plans, came on board as
momentum built. The local Democratic Party decided to
endorse the measure soon after it qualified for the ballot
and offered to partner with the campaign. The measure’s
proponents, overwhelmed by the input from people seen
as experts in local elections and environmental politics,
and tempted by the idea that securing the support of
loyal Democrats and Independents who vote democratic
would be their best chance to win, agreed. Though Santa
Barbara County leans democratic, in October , only
% of voters were registered Democrats. Aligning with
the Democratic Party may have dampened bipartisan
support for the measure, whose focus on water quality
had potential as a bipartisan message.
Turning the campaign over to the Democratic Party
also had the effect of changing the structure of organiz-
ing. Whereas proponents had cultivated distributed
leadership with team captains during the signature
phase, in the lead-up to the November election, this
structure was replaced with phone banking and precinct
walking in which volunteers were instructed, through a
leadership hierarchy, to follow Democratic Party scripts
to communicate with voters. While volunteers had pre-
viously focused on their own neighborhoods, in this
model, they were distributed throughout the county,
regardless of their residence. This, combined with burn-
out from the signature effort, disillusioned some key vol-
unteers, myself included. All volunteers, no matter what
role they had played in the signature effort, were
expected to return all data to the Democratic Party
who took primary responsibility for compiling data,
developing timelines, and determining which voters vol-
unteers contacted. Becca Claassen co-originated the
campaign and though she had the title of Campaign
Committee Chair, felt disempowered by the new cam-
paign structure. If she were to do it again, she explained
that she would have advocated
starting voter contact much earlier, less phone calls and
more door-to-door, more face-to-face, more empower-
ment and actual relationship building, not considering
everybody on your list just a volunteer. Sure there are
those people who just want to be told what to do . . .
but there are other people who have valid concerns and
opinions and know their neighborhoods better than
you do.We were encouraged [by the Democratic Party]
to just tell the volunteers what to do, make them stick
to the script. It felt very hierarchical and top-down, not
empowering, if anything it was disempowering
(interview).
The collaboration did have positive elements. It
allowed proponents to use Democratic Party office
space, precinct and phone banking databases, and to
have their measure on party literature. Together, Demo-
cratic Party and Yes on P volunteers made hundreds of
thousands of phone calls and knocked on thousands of
doors in an unprecedented field campaign in the county.
Yet, alongside these benefits came a change in the spirit
of the campaign that many core organizers regretted.
They felt that the Democratic Party benefitted more
from the popular movement proponents galvanized
than the measure benefitted from the Democratic
Party. They looked to the success of a  fracking
ban in San Benito County, where the grassroots origina-
tors of the campaign maintained autonomy from political
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parties, as an example of a different method for carrying out
the campaign. In , Monterey County also successfully
passed a ban with an autonomous grassroots campaign.
Monterey County had a higher percentage of registered
Democrats than Santa Barbara County, but also produced
more oil and faced similar opposition funding.
The vote reflected sharp demographic and regional
divides in the county. Overall, % of voters were in support,
comprised largely of students and residents of the city of
Santa Barbara. Nearly % of voters in North County,
largely Latinos and conservative leaning white voters, were
against the measure compared to .% in South County.
These results were also affected by epically low voter turnout.
Nationwide, it was the lowest in  years [] and in Santa
Barbara, only % of registered voters cast votes. Students,
the strongest supporters of the measure, with % yes
votes, had only % voter turnout.
CONCLUSION
Though Measure P failed, it was an impressive grassroots
mobilization, particularly in the signature-gathering
phase. With more preparation time, less opposition
from the oil industry and county staff, and greater
voter turnout, the results may have been different.
While heads of established environmental organizations
in Santa Barbara feared the defeat would be a setback for
local environmental politics, these fears did not material-
ize. Rather than dissipating, the energy behind Measure
P seemed to infuse political will for other forms of pro-
gressive environmental policy.
In spring , the Santa Barbara County Board of
Supervisors approved the state’s most stringent carbon
emissions levels for oil projects and funded a feasibility
study for community choice aggregation, which could
increase renewable energy. In November , the board
rejected an oil project with stricter controls than the
Santa Maria Energy Project, described above, which the
same board approved in . In the  election, a former
environmental attorney won the contentious rd District
Supervisor seat, which straddles North and South County,
maintaining a three to two progressive majority on the
Board of Supervisors. Her opponent received over $,
in funding from energy producers.
Positive energy outcomes have occurred in other loca-
tions as well. In the  and  elections, there were
multiple ballot and legislative efforts to ban fracking
throughout the United States. Just a month after Measure
P’s defeat, New York State banned fracking.With the addi-
tion of Monterey County, California now has six counties
that have banned fracking. Monterey County’s “Measure
Z” is more restrictive than Measure P, banning intensive
techniques, wastewater injection, and all future conven-
tional wells.
Moving forward, grassroots groups could learn from this
case to cultivate and empower horizontal leadership, build
strong long-term coalitions with all sectors of communities,
stay on their strongest message, and counter jobs versus
environment debates by incorporating support for renew-
able energy industry jobs in projects to oppose oil and gas
development.
CASE STUDY QUESTIONS
. What were the concerns and perceived
opportunities that precipitated this campaign?
. Identify benefits and problems that resulted from
activists’ alliance with the Democratic Party.
Would you have partnered with the Democratic
Party? Explain.
. Reflect on the researcher’s involvement with the
campaign. Do you think researchers should be
involved with the groups they study? Explain.
What ethical issues arise? How can these be
mitigated?
. Consider ballot measures in comparison to other
ways to restrict oil and gas development, such as
legal suits, direct action, campaigning for or
lobbying elected leaders who are anti-oil and gas,
or corporate social responsibility. What
opportunities and challenges does this change-
making strategy entail?
. What sectors of, and spokespeople from your
community would you want to approach and
have on your side before trying to enact change on
an issue that is relevant to your life?
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